Dan Bernstein discussed various attempts to resolve bugs in ciphersuites in his keynote "Failures of secret-key cryptography" at the March Fast Sofware Encryption event. Then (fast-forwarding to pages 35-38) he says:
“Cryptographic algorithm agility”:
(1) the pretense that bad crypto is okay if there’s a backup plan +
(2) the pretense that there is in fact a backup plan.
SSL has a crypto switch that in theory allows switching to AES-GCM.
But most SSL software doesn’t support AES-GCM.
The software does support one non-CBC option: RC4.
Now widely recommended, used for 50% of SSL traffic.
after which, DJB then proceeds to roundly trash RC4 as a favoured algorithm... Which is entirely fair, as RC4 has been under a cloud and deprecated since the late 1990s. In the slides, he reportst results from AlFardan–Bernstein– Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt that somewhere between 2^24 and 2^32 ciphertexts is what it takes to recover a plaintext byte. Ouch!
This attack on algorithm agility is strongly reminiscent of the One True Cipher Suite, which hypothesis also takes as a foundational assumption that algorithm agility doesn't work. So, abandon algorithm agility if you value your users.
(For further amusement, in slide 2-3, he takes aim at what I and Gutmann pronounced in 2011 and Adi's Shamir's statement that crypto is bypassed, which I'll post on later.)Posted by iang at December 4, 2013 02:35 AM | TrackBack