related to "security proportional to risk" ... old standby
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61

and one of the first places that I encounted the issue:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006q.html#36

however, a couple recent posts looking at the "threat model"
aspect of "security proportional to risk"
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm25.htm#32
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006r.html#28

the original thread was can you trust rfid/contractless chips to not leak information. the "threat model" aspect is what kind of information might be leaked.

in the "yes card" vulnerability ... lots of past posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#yescard

the information is used in "something you have" authentication operation ... i.e. cloning/copying information can be sufficient for performing fraudulent transactions.

in the passport scenario ... it is supposedly personal information that is part of "something you are" authentication. the photo still has to be matched against your face.

the leakage of personal information can still represent a privacy vulnerability ... but it depends on the type of information and the associated useage.

we had to looked at some of this when we were working on x9.99 financial industry privacy standard ... including reviewing eu-dpd, hipaa, and glba. during this work, i put together a merged privacy taxonomy and glossary
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/privacy.htm

see notes at:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#glosnote

and the oft repeated past comment ... much of current financial transaction infrastructure is based on static data authentication ... and therefor is quite vulnerable to any sort of leakage;

from the security PAIN acronym

* privacy (or sometimes CAIN and confidentiality)
* authentication
* integrity
* non-repudiation

the existing financial transaction infrastructure tends to rely heavily on authentication that requires privacy/confidentiality (i.e. the information has to be kept hidden and never exposed).

x9.59 financial standard
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#x959

moved it from privacy/confidentiality requirement to an integrity requirement. the x9a10 financial standard working group had been given the requirement to preserve the integrity of the financial infrastructure for all retail payments. x9.59 changed the transaction paradigm from requiring the information to be hidden in order to have security to requiring integrity in order to have security (i.e. it isn't necessary to hide an x9.59 transaction in order to preserve the integrity of the financial infrastructure for all retail payments)

re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm25.htm#33

oh and "security proportional to risk" just raised in real time in comp.arch regarding theft of trade secrets ... and comment that it may lead to eliminating dialup internet use for telecommuting

my reply/comments:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006r.html#29

we had looked at this issue some 25 years ago with regard to dail-up telecommuting. one of the issues found was that hotel PBXs are a major vulnerability ... almost anybody can get into them and install various kinds of evesdropping.

the result was the corporation built special encrypting dial-up modems ... that included stuff like session handshaking and session dynamic key exchange ... which was then mandated for all offsite (dial-up) connection into company facilities.

as i've mentioned in the past, the company's internal network was larger than the arpanet/internet from just about the beginning until possibly sometime mid-85.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork.html#internalnet

and link encrypters were required on all network links that left corporate facilities. sometime in the mid-80s, it was also claimed that the internal network had over half of all link encrypters in the world.

misc. past posts mentioning the hotel pbx vulnerability:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#4 NEWS: 3D-Secure and Passport
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#1 Who's afraid of Mallory Wolf?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#37 Who's afraid of Mallory Wolf?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#52 "Slower is more secure"
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#17 pbx security from 20 years ago
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#34 network history
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004q.html#57 high speed network, cross-over from sci.crypt
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2005r.html#12 Intel strikes back with a parallel x86 design
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006p.html#35 Metroliner telephone article

http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/secgrouplist.html Hmm, I am wondering why Window Snyder isn´t on the list yet?

Firefox is snapper than Internet Explorer, the fixes have bogged the Microsoft boat.