Comments: OneRNG -- open source design for your random numbers

Ahem.

"We make sure that the internal firmware load is signed and cannot be spoofed."

And:

"What we do know is that the NSA has [...] paid some large crypto vendors millions of dollars to make their software less secure".

...including RSA Inc (both a big crypto vendor and a public-key algorithm bearing the same name).

So, as public-key crypto can't be trusted, hardware and software claiming to be certified by untrustworthy crypto is certainly suspect.

As OpenSSL has shown, being "open-source" is certainly not a proof of competence, honesty or trustworthiness.

By the way, Dual_EC_DRBG, the "suspected" PRNG is still in use by the "trusted" vendors[1]... 9 years after a 2005 patent[2] demonstrated how to use it to compromize people's encryption keys.

So much for the trust.

[1] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgval.html

[2]
https://projectbullrun.org/dual-ec/patent.html

Posted by Claudius at December 23, 2014 12:03 PM

Hi Claudius,

If you don't wish to trust the firmware image that comes on the device, you are free to provide your own firmware instead, or to recompile the original from source. This requires some effort (and a second hardware device to reprogram the unit) but should help to mitigate the position of not trusting the way the firmware is signed.

This is pretty much the whole point of Open Hardware/Open Software, which was a core fundamental of the design of this unit. If you don't like what has been provided, you have the information needed to change it.

OneRNG's security stance isn't about trust.

-jim, OneRNG team

Posted by Jim at January 4, 2015 09:49 PM
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