Comments: Secret Ballot Receipts and Transparent Integrity

Of course that is not a new concept, that the level of security necessary for electronic payments to be viable is not very high.

Losses from fraud (aggregated with other types of costs) need only be lower than the "benefits" in the hands of the actors who control the platform decisions. For example card services and even ATMs have never had very strong security, and have suffered costly losses, but were able to plow them back onto cardholders and retailers, and stiff the taxpayers with policing costs.

But I'm not posting this morning, to deliver a big editorial.

I just want to make the point that security for voting doesn't have to be very strong either. The value of one vote is NOT as high as say, the credit limit available in the average credit card, in the average purse or wallet.

What is *exceedlingly* valuable is a systematic weakness allowing a party to control *many* votes. Efforts to improve voting security might benefit from this insight. For example, you can get a false confidence from paper trails, verifying individual votes, while voting outcomes can still be changed by some piece of the downstream tabulating or reporting.

Oh well. A rather obvious point. Too much expresso again maybe.

I just think they should issue every citizen a "citizens signing device" at birth and be done with it. If the technology industry cant get such a simple thing right, then to HELL with them. Really, I am thinking of smashing my computer, along with my TV these days,

Let it happen. AR AP everywhere.

Posted by Todd at May 16, 2004 04:43 PM
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