Timeline on a hash collision attack:
|1995||SHA1 published due to weaknesses found|
|2001||SHA2 published due to expectations of weakness in SHA1|
|2005||Shandong team MD5 attacked, SHA1 worried|
|2009?||RocketSSL breached for using MD5|
|2014||Chrome responds and starts phasing out SHA1|
|2017||CWI & Google announce collision attack on SHA1|
The point I wish to make here is that SHA1 was effectively deprecated in 2001 with the publication of SHA2. If you are vulnerable to a collision attack, then you had your moment of warning sixteen years ago.
On the other hand, think about this for a moment - in 2005 the Shandong shot was heard around the cryptographic world. Everyone knew! But we now see that SHA1 lasted an additional 12 years before it crumbled to a collision attack. That shows outstanding strength, an incredible run.
On the third hand, let's consider your protocol. If your protocol is /not/ vulnerable to a collision attack then SHA1 is still good. As is SHA0 and MD5. And, as an aside, no protocol should be vulnerable to a collision attack - such weakness is probably a bug.
So SHA1 is technically only a problem if you have another weakness in your protocol. And if you have that weakness, well, it's a pretty big one, and you should be worried for everything, not just SHA1.
On the fourth hand, however, institutions are too scared to understand the difference, and too bureaucratic to suggest better practices like eliminating collision vulnerabilities. Hence, all software suppliers have been working to deprecate SHA1 from consideration. To show you how asinine this gets, some software suppliers are removing older hash functions so, presumably you can't use them - to either make new ones or check old ones. (Doh!)
Security moves as a herd not as a science. Staying within the herd provides sociability in numbers, but social happiness shouldn't be mistaken for security, as the turkey well knows.
Finally, on the fifth hand, I still use SHA1 in Ricardo for naming Ricardian Contracts. Try for the life of me, and I still can't see how to attack it with collisions. As, after all, the issuer signs his own contract, and if he collides, he's up for both contracts, and there are copies of both distributed...
There is no cause for panic, if you've done your homework.Posted by iang at February 23, 2017 01:47 PM