In the long running saga of the Snowden revelations, another fact is confirmed by ashkan soltani. It's the last point on this slide showing some nice redaction minimisation.
(U) The CCP expects this Project to accomplish the following in FY 2013:
Confirmed: the NSA manipulates the commercial providers of cryptography to make it easier to crack their product. When I said, avoid American-influenced cryptography, I wasn't joking: the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) is consolidating access to your crypto.
(TS//SI//NF) The SIGINT Enabling Project actively engages the US and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products' designs. These design changes make the systems in question exploitable through SIGINT collection (e.g., Endpoint, MidPoint, etc.) with foreknowledge of the modification. ....
Note also that the classification for the goal above differs in that it is NF -- No Foreigners -- whereas most of the other goals listed are REL TO USA, FVEY which means the goals can be shared with the Five Eyes Intelligence Community (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand).
The more secret it is, the more clearly important is this goal. The only other goal with this level of secrecy was the one suggesting an actual target of sensitivity -- fair enough. More confirmation:
(U) Base resources in this project are used to:
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks and endpoint communications devices used by targets.
and in goals 4, 5:
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Complete enabling for [XXXXXX] encryption chips used in Virtual Private Network and Web encryption devices. [CCP_00009].
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Make gains in enabling decryption and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) access to fourth generation/Long Term Evolution (4GL/LTE) networks via enabling. [CCP_00009]
Obviously, we're interested in the [XXXXXX] above. But the big picture is complete: the NSA wants backdoor access to every chip used for encryption in VPNs, wireless routers and the cell network.
This is no small thing. There should be no doubt now that the NSA actively looks to seek backdoors in any interesting cryptographic tool. Therefore, the NSA is numbered amongst the threats, and so are your cryptographic providers, if they are within reach of the NSA.
Granted that other countries might behave the same way. But the NSA has the resources, the will, the market domination (consider Microsoft's CAPI, Java's Cryptography Engine, Cisco & Juniper on routing, FIPS effect on SSL, etc) and now the track record to make this a more serious threat.
Posted by iang at November 10, 2013 06:48 AM | TrackBack