It's been a while since SWIFT was in the news, but they're back! Chris points out that a class action suit has been permitted against them in Federal court:
In his 20-page opinion, Judge Holderman rejected SWIFT's defense that it acted in good faith by relying on government subpoenas. Any claim to "unfettered government access to the bank records of private citizens" is "constitutionally problematic", the court said.
In refusing to dismiss the case, Judge Holderman noted reports that "SWIFT officials were aware that their disclosures were legally suspect, but they nevertheless continued to supply database information to the U.S. government."
This might follow the progress of the illegal wiretapping case before Judge Diggs. There, the state said "state secrets" and the Judge responded "it's not a secret anymore..."
Which means illegal behaviour can be tried. Why are we so interested? Behaviour that is "probably illegal" and "definately deceptive" behaviour needs to be documented because that might suggest a finding that the US government cannot be expected to secure the privacy of any data. This applies more easily to that of foreigners and their SWIFT data, but customarily, what applies to foreigners soon then applies to locals (laws aside).
For example, Todd reports that the French are having trouble stopping their parliamentarians from passing their secrets across on Blackberries:
Members of the new French cabinet have been told to stop using their BlackBerries because of fears that the US could intercept state secrets. The SGDN, which is responsible for national security, has banned the use of the personal data assistants by anyone in the president’s or prime minister’s offices on the basis of “a very real risk of interception” by third parties.
The ban has been prompted by SGDN concerns that the BlackBerry system is based on servers located in the US and the UK, and that highly sensitive strategic information being passed between French ministers could fall into foreign hands. A confidential study carried out two years ago by Alain Juillet, the civil servant in charge of economic intelligence, found that the BlackBerry posed “a data security problem”.
Mr Juillet noted that US bankers would prove their bona fides in meetings by first placing their BlackBerries on the table and removing the batteries.
Some older notes.
Military intel is now accessing bank accounts of US persons. Now, this falls somewhat in the bucket of "expected" so why comment? Two possible reasons. Firstly, because we have a number:
Military intelligence officials have used the letters in about 500 investigations over the past five years, while the CIA issues a 'handful' of such letters every year, The Times wrote on its website late Saturday. Civil rights experts and defence lawyers were critical of the practice.
In comparison, the domestic law enforcement agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), makes much more frequent use of the letters to get financial information, and served about 9,000 such letters in 2005 alone, said justice officials.
( old dead link.) With numbers, we can calculate risk scenarios for financial cryptography applications. (It might be more interesting to some for example to look at total Internet intercepts; but we could hazard a guess that this is the same order of magnitude.)
The Times cited two examples where the military used the letters - one was a government contractor with unexpected wealth, another was a Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo Bay prison for terrorist suspects.
Secondly, because of the above privacy question. Concentrate on the first case: this is a clear suggestion of fraud. That's a regular crime. There are courts, judges, prosecutors, defence attorneys, and PIs lined up from coast to coast in the US for that sort of thing. So why did the military bypass normal chains of investigation and prosecution, and use the nuclear option?
Because it could. There is no climate of fear of prosecution for overstepping the bounds. There is no particular climate that tools should be limited in use. This would support a finding that data will be misused.
Caveat: we probably need to verify those statements before getting too confident.Posted by iang at June 20, 2007 05:29 AM | TrackBack