July 28, 2006

Firefox as a mainstream security risk - three threats

As predicted, Firefox is now a member of that unenviable club -- "fair game" for crackers:

Upon successful execution, FormSpy hooks mouse and keyboard events in the Mozilla Firefox web browser. It can then forwards information such as credit card numbers, passwords and URLs typed in the browser to a malicious website hosted at IP address 81.95.xx.xx.
And, a bunch of reports on a security advisory 1, 2, 3, 4.

Also, a very strange one where PrivSoft, security firm labelled a root key as viral from the Bermudan certificate authority QuoVadis:

On Saturday, July 22, 2006 we added a "signature" to BOClean called "QUOVADIS" based upon a submission to us by one of our external malware research partners. The submission was reviewed by one of our own malware analysts and was determined to be extremely suspicious because it modified the Windows registry "trusted certificates" store and that's always a "no-no." The fact that it was submitted out of context to its origin unfortunately lead us to believe by its design and nature that it was a Mozilla hijacker since it appeared to be legitimate and yet didn't pass the "smell test" because of its internal contents and behavior. We encounter similar "infections" often. The decision was "unfortunately" made to err on the side of caution and INCLUDE it in BOClean's update of that day.

Within a little over an hour, based upon numerous complaints of a "false positive," we removed detection for the NSSCKBI.DLL file as QUOVADIS malware. Now, we're not quite sure if there actually isn't an issue there, though apparently not one that rises to the level of an actual piece of malware since Mozilla's browsers are "trusted." As is the case with any "surprise" here, a post mortem remains in progress on our end to bring closure and internal policy changes to prevent any future "unfortunate events" such as this.

Mozilla's NSSCKBI.DLL file contains a number of "secure sockets layer" (SSL) certificates, including certificates from several unknown and possibly dubious "certifying authorities." ...

I don't fully understand that, but it reads as though someone complained about the Quovadis root key (which I understand to be a valid CA), and the security firm blocked the whole root list in the DLL? Either way, "privsoft" seems to have been disconnected from the net as we know it; the information on who is a valid CA or not is widely available on Mozilla's pages. And an email to Frank would have sorted it out...

It will be interesting to see just what this complaint really was -- an enterprising CA engaged in corporate provocation? Bad security firms dropping the bundle like they did with Sony? Or is the Quovadis root really involved in some sense in a malicious change the windows registry? Keep it up, guys, us ignorant journos and our readers want scandal, intrigue, and see if you can do something about spies and tits for us too, please!

What else? Well, I've also seen a demo of the latest generation attacks against Firefox (if you read the blog, you know what I mean). Unfortunately, when it was shown around, the banks said "oh-my-god, who have you shown this to? you can't reveal this..."

This is a direct case of fear of fingerpointing, which I outline in my paper on "The Market for Silver Bullets."

Should such things be published? The answer is YES! Firstly, the attackers already have this, they are smarter and more focussed, and if they only appear not to have attacked it is because they have other things to do that make them money. Focus, ROI, two easy words. (As if to underscore this point, first reports have it that European banks are being attacked with an innovative MITB that asks for two TANS, so far targetted at IE only.)

Did I say that the attackers were smarter than the banks? Yes, I did. Get used to it.

Secondly, consider the *user* community, which includes all Alices and Bobs, all Grandmas, all banks in countries where they haven't figured it out yet (e.g., the US of A), and all the other non-bank suppliers who are about to be surprised at how far this threat reaches.

They ... heck ... *we all need this information* so that they can assess risks in going forward. It may surprise the banks, but it is their customers' right to know when it is unsafe to engage in online banking.

Why this discrepancy? The banks do not carry the costs of risks to others, so they don't care. They only care about their own costs, which in the end are surprisingly limited, surprisingly manageable, even in the American phishing epidemic.

Why then are the banks so fiercely protective of their security weaknesses? Because embarrassment in the press is far more costly than any mere security breach! As they bear these costs themselves, directly, and the costs spread contagiously through the industry, they are vulnerable to what I call fingerpointing. This then drives them to render all security issues under a secrecy order, industry wide. For more understanding of why banks are not particularly concerned about the user's risks, read the paper.

Which leaves me wondering where Firefox is heading, market-wise. If anything, things like GreaseMonkey and the spectacular plugins market are making Firefox a more likely target for security concerns. I've also noticed a bit of a ground shift in talk over at Mozilla -- they no longer refer to Firefox as more secure than IE. That is wise, as it seems that Microsoft are doing more in that area. If the IE and Vista teams succeed in making a difference, Firefox can expect to be hammered into the ground.

Which isn't necessarily bad. Mozilla are leaning towards a mission of "choice" in tools, which is no bad mission. It's simply not necessary or smart to be all things to all people, it is better to concentrate on where we can make a difference.

But it does leave a hole in the market for a security browser. And it raises the question for the FC blog of revising our top tips for security. Any call?

Posted by iang at July 28, 2006 08:40 AM | TrackBack
Comments

Don't have time to comment on anything else, but the Quovadis thing was basically a function of people who didn't understand the difference between the Firefox root list (kept in a DLL) and the Windows/IE root list (kept in the registry). They kept trying to delete the root cert in Firefox, saw that this had no effect on the registry (d'oh!), and then leapt to conclusions that there was some kind of trojan running.

As to why Quovadis got singled out, I think it was simply that they'd never heard of a CA named "Quovadis", and they thought it sounded more like what someone would name a trojan than "Geotrust" or "VeriSign" :-)

Posted by: Frank Hecker at July 28, 2006 10:32 PM

I think, it is not the browser's job to decide which root certificate to trust. It's the user's job.
Of course, as long as CAs keep financing browser development, security takes a back seat.

Posted by: Daniel A. Nagy at July 30, 2006 04:36 AM

Privsoft may have blown it, but someone sees this as an attractive attack vector!

http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?compare=1&storyid=1543&isc=b05ac907ada17fb718bb9e3d02dab2f6

Posted by: ~ at August 7, 2006 03:27 PM
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